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   1 
The Contracting Experiments in Detail 
The experimental design of the contracting sessions builds upon BSW and Schotter and 
Weigelt (SW), and is nearly identical to those of Wu and Roe (WR), and Wu, et. al.  
Thus, we will not provide a detailed treatment of the underlying mathematics, and instead 
refer the reader to (WR), and Wu et. al.  Here we will focus on providing the reader with 
only enough detail to conceptualize the experiments.  
In each contracting session, subjects play 10 identical rounds of each contracting 
game.  In each round, subjects begin by choosing a costly “decision number” (effort) 
from 0 to 100.  Higher effort levels costs more and once a subject chooses an effort level, 
she looks up the cost of that effort level from a table distributed to her.  She subsequently 
records this cost on a worksheet.  An example of a cost table is shown on page 14.   All 
subjects are informed of all experimental parameters, including opponents’ cost tables.  
In fact, during asymmetric cost experiments, both the low and high cost tables are 
projected onto a screen during the experiments and each low cost subject knows that her 
pair member has the high cost table and vice versa.  Only the identity of pair members is 
unknown.  Next, a subject is randomly chosen to draw a “common shock” number from a 
bucket and all subjects add this to their decision numbers.  Then each subject randomly 
draws a personal “idiosyncratic shock” number from another bucket and adds this 
number to her decision number and the common shock number.   Both the idiosyncratic 
and common shocks are normally distributed (but may have different variances) and 
copies of the probability distributions for all shocks are given to subjects before the 
experiment and explained in detail.  The sum of the decision number, common shock and   2 
idiosyncratic shock yields a subject’s performance for the round.  The mathematical 
expression of performance in a two-player tournament is:  
(A1)  yi = ei + uC + ui                               i =1, 2 
where yi is performance, ei is effort,  uC is a common shock, and ui is an idiosyncratic 
shock that is independently and identically distributed across i.  We also assume that 
2 (0, ) C C u N s ￿ ,  
2 (0, ) i u N s ￿ ,  ( , ) 0 C i Cov u u = , and  ( , ) 0 i j Cov u u = , " i ¹ j.  The way we 
implement the random shock in the experiments is to approximate each shock using 300 
pennies each marked with an outcome.  The frequency for each outcome is determined by 
approximating the number of outcomes out of 300 that occur under a normal distribution.  
For experiment 1, for example, we calculate the probability function in Excel for a 
normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 15.8, and multiply the 
probability for each outcome by 300 and round to the nearest integer.  We then place the 
300 pennies in a bucket and have subjects draw a penny for each shock. 
 In T sessions, administrators compare outputs of pair members; the pair member 
with more (less) output receives high payment, R (low payment r), where R > r.  That is, 
if yi > yj, then player i receives a high payment, R, and player j receives a low payment, r, 
and vice versa (ties are broken by coin flip).  All subjects were informed of the specific 
values of R and r at the beginning of each session.  Each subject only knows her payment 
and not the difference in output.
  This is consistent with the way many comparative 
performance contracts work where growers/workers are informed about their rankings 
but are not provided detailed information about competitors’ performance.  
 In F sessions, administrators compare output to some fixed standard, y*,  which 
we set to “41.”  If performance exceeds 41, the subject receives high payment R.  If not,   3 
she receives the low payment, r.  We avoided the obvious choice of y* = 37 so that 
subjects are not provided a focal point to which they might naturally gravitate.  Instead, 
we choose y* = 41 and then adjust our payment spread to ensure that 37 is the optimal 
choice. To end the round, subjects subtract effort-costs, which were determined at the 
beginning of the round when effort was chosen, from revenue (R or r), and record the 
result (profits) in a worksheet. At the end of round 10, subjects calculate cumulative 
payoffs.  A session lasts about 20 minutes. 
   We ran a total of seven experiments, with three of the experiments involving 
asymmetric cost subjects where half the subjects were randomly assigned “high” effort-
cost tables and the other half “low” effort-cost tables.  And then each high cost subject 
was paired with a low cost subject for the T-sessions.  For the F-sessions, no such pairing 
was necessary because each subject competes only against the fixed threshold y*.   In the 
remaining four symmetric cost experiments, all subjects were assigned identical effort-
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which is identical to the cost function used by BSW.   In the asymmetric cost 











Heterogeneity is created by letting the parameter  i a  vary across agents.  For high cost 
subjects, we set  1.5 i a = , and for low cost subjects, we set  1 i a = , which is identical to 
(A2).  Examples of cost tables for the asymmetric cost experiments are provided on pages 
18 and 19.   4 
In order to calculate expected payoffs under T and F for a given subject, we first 
have to define the probabilities of “winning” under T and the probability of exceeding the 
threshold y* under F.  Under T, this is Prob( i j y y > ) = Prob( i j j i u u e e - > - ) = 
1 ( ) j i F e e - -  where ui – uj ~ N(0, 2s
2) and F(·) is the normal CDF of  i j u u - .  Under F, 
the probability that agent i will exceed y* is Pr ( *) i ob y y > = Prob(uC + ui > y* - ei) = 1 - 
( * ) i G y e - , where uC + ui ~ N(0, 
2 2
C s s + ) and G(·) is the normal cumulative density 
function of uC + ui.  To make F(·) and G(·) operational, we had to choose specific values 
for 
2
C s  and 
2 s  which are listed in table 1 in the AJAE article.  Now it is straightforward 
to calculate the per-round expected payoffs.  The expected payoff in the symmetric T-
session is: 
(A4)  [ ]
2





E r F e e R r
a
p ￿ ￿ = + - - - - ￿ ￿    i =1,2  
where  1 i a =  for the low cost subject and  1.5 i a =  for the high cost subject.  For 
symmetric cost experiments,  1 i a =  for all subjects.  Finally, the expected per-round 
payoff under the F-contract is 
(A5)  [ ][ ]
2





E r G y e R r
a
p = + - - - -    i =1,2 
where  1 i a =  for all subjects in the symmetric cost experiments.  In the asymmetric cost 
experiments,  1 i a =  or  1.5 i a =  depending on whether subject i is high or low cost.   
  We can calculate actual numeric values for expected payoffs by choosing specific 
numeric values for 
2
C s , 
2 s ,  i a , R and r.  Moreover, choosing specific values of these 
parameters should also affect optimizing behavior of our subjects; that is, the optimal   5 
effort they choose under each of the contracts.  For example, under the T contract, the 
two-players paired together will choose effort levels that simultaneously satisfy their first 
order conditions from (A4) which are: 
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Solving (A6) and (A7) simultaneously will yield the Nash equilibrium effort levels for 
the two players.  While the tournament was repeated over 10 rounds, the theory is based 
on a static model.  Such repetition is common in experimental practice because subjects 
make complex decisions.  Moreover, the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to a 
finitely repeated game is the Nash equilibrium decision level to the one-shot game.  Thus, 
predictions concerning equilibrium play were independent of finite repetition (BSW).  
Note that the solutions will depend on the specific numeric values of R, r, i a , 
2
C s , and 
2 s .  The variances 
2
C s  and 
2 s will affect the first order conditions via the normal density 
function  2 1 ( ) f e e - .  The specific numeric values of 
2
C s , 
2 s ,  i a , R and r for the seven 
experiments are listed in table 1.  Optimal effort under F is determined by the first order 
condition of (A5), which is:  
(A8)  [ ]
( ) 2
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Solving (A8) for each subject i, would yield the optimal effort level under F.   
  All first order conditions, (A6) and (A7), and (A8) were solved in Maple software 
program which yields solutions listed in column (1) of table 2 in the AJAE article.  The 
Maple software programs are available upon request from the authors, but examples are   6 
provided later in this document.  For readers interested in more detail, we refer them to 
(WR), and Wu, et. al. 
Contracting Under Inequity Aversion 
Fehr and Schmidt (FS) argue that, while many people may adhere to standard 
assumptions and care only about material payoffs, a non-negligible fraction also care 
about relative payoffs.  Inequity aversion means people will forgo some payment to 
increase the equity of payouts across subjects.  Consider a simple version of FS’s model: 
(B1)  ( ) max[ ,0] max[ ,0] i i i j i i i j U x x x x x x d b = - - - -          for i j ¹  
where xi is agent i’s payoffs, and the index j denotes a reference agent.  The second term 
in (B1) captures utility loss from disadvantaged inequity, while the third term captures 
advantageous inequity.  FS assume  i i d b >  or that agent i’s utility loss is greater when 
agent i has the lower payoff.  This utility structure implies that, given some absolute 
monetary payoff, agent i’s utility is highest when payoffs are equal, and that people are 
more averse to disadvantaged inequity than advantaged inequity.   
  Grund and Sliwka used FS’s insights to develop a model of tournaments where 
agents exhibit inequity aversion.   In a two-player tournament, if player i “wins”, she will 
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d = - - - .  Expected utility for agent i is then: 
(B2)
[ ] [ ] [ ]
2
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
10,000
T i i
IE j i j i i j i i
e
E U r F e e R r F e e R r F e e R r
a
b d ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = + - - - - - - - - - - - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Comparing (B2) to (A4), one can see inequity aversion causes an expected utility loss in   7 
the amount  [ ] [ ] 1 ( ) ( ) j i i j i i F e e R r F e e R r b d ￿ ￿ - - - + - - ￿ ￿ .  If we assume that agents are 
not averse to advantaged inequity, which is consistent with our econometric results, then 
this loss reduces to just  [ ] ( ) j i i F e e R r d - -  because  0 i b = . 
Moving to F contracts, note that there are four scenarios that might be relevant.  
Both agents can earn the high payment, which is not possible under T, resulting in no 
inequity.  Agent i can earn the high payment while agent j earns the low payment 
resulting in advantaged inequity for agent i, and vice versa.  Finally, both agents can earn 
the low payment, which, again, is not possible under T, resulting in no inequity.  
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= - .  Hence, we have: 
(B3)  [ ][ ] [ ] [ ] 1 ( * ) 1 ( * ) ( * )
F
IE i i j i E U r G y e R r G y e G y e R r b ￿ ￿ = + - - - - - - - - ￿ ￿  
   
2
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The expected loss from inequity is thus [ ] [ ] 1 ( * ) ( * ) i j i G y e G y e R r b - - - -   
1 ( * ) ( * ) ( ) j i i G y e G y e R r d ￿ ￿ + - - - - ￿ ￿ .  If  0 i b =  so that the agent is not averse to 
advantaged inequity, then this loss reduces to  1 ( * ) ( * ) ( ) j i i G y e G y e R r d ￿ ￿ - - - - ￿ ￿ .  Note 
that the loss from disadvantaged inequity is not as severe under F as it is under T due to 
the fact inequity will occur less frequently under F.  
We now turn to an analysis of how incentives are affected by inequity.  This also 
provides an outline of how predicted effort levels under inequity aversion (table 2 in   8 
AJAE article) were calculated.  Using B2, we can calculate the first order conditions for 
both players in a two-player tournament as:  
(B4)  [ ][ ]
1 1
2 1 1 1
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(B5)  [ ][ ]
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Solving (B4) and (B5) simultaneously will yield the Nash equilibrium effort levels.  The 
main difference between the standard first-order conditions, (A6) and (A7) and the 
inequity averse first-order conditions is the presence of the term [ ] 1 i i d b + - , which, by 
the assumption that subjects dislike disadvantaged inequity more than advantaged 
inequity, is greater than 1.  Hence, effort will be greater for inequity averse agents.  We 
use Maple software to generate numeric solutions using the same parameter values for R, 
r, i a , 
2
C s , and 
2 s  as we used for the non-inequity averse simulations.  We also had to 
choose specific values for the parameters i b  and  i d .  We chose  0 i b =  (subjects not 
averse to advantaged inequity, which is consistent with our econometric results) and 
0.15 i d = (mild aversion to disadvantaged inequity).  The results of these simulations are 
contained in the parentheses in column 2 of table 2 in the AJAE article. 
Equation (B3) can be used to generate first order conditions for the F-contract: 
(B6) 
2
( * )( ) 1 (1 ( * )) ( * )
i i
i j i j j
e
g y e R r G y e G y e
k
a
d b ￿ ￿ - - + - - - - - ￿ ￿ =0. 
Although disadvantaged inequity still affects effort under F, the impact is scaled down by 
the probability that another subject will receive a different payoff, so that the impact of 
inequity is less under F than T.   Numerical solutions for optimal effort are also   9 
calculated using Maple and all software programs are available from the authors, 
although examples are provided later in this document.      
   10 
Example of Experimental Instructions for Symmetric Cost Tournaments 
Introduction 
 
This is an experiment about decision making.  The instructions are simple, and if you 
follow them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of 




As you read these instructions you will be in a room with a number of other subjects.  
One of these subjects has been chosen to be paired with you by a random drawing of 
subject numbers conducted before you arrived.  This subject will be called your pair 
member.  The identity of your pair member will never be revealed to you and your pair 
member will never know your identity. 
 
In the experiment you will perform a simple task.  In each round of the experimental 
game you will choose a number between 0 and 100 – this is called your ‘Decision 
Number’.  Associated with each Decision Number is decision cost, which is listed in 
Column B of Table 1.  Note that the higher the Decision Number you choose, the higher 
is the associated decision cost.  Your pair member has an identical table.   
 
At the beginning of each round of the experimental game you and your pair member will 
each select a Decision Number separately.  Write your number in Column 1 of Sheet 1.  
Also, record the decision cost associated with your decision number in Column 6 of 
Sheet 1. 
 
When all subjects have selected their decision numbers, an experimenter will have one 
subject choose a penny from a bucket with a large number of pennies in it.  Each penny 
in the bucket has a number written on it and the set of all possible numbers range from –
35 to + 35.  The sheet “Distribution of the Random Number Draw” contains both the 
frequency (number of pennies for each specific number) and the probability of drawing a 
particular number.  You will note that more pennies feature numbers closer to zero and 
the fewer pennies feature numbers close to –35 and +35.  In other words, there is a higher 
probability of drawing numbers closer to zero than numbers far from zero.  The penny 
chosen will be called the ‘Group Random Draw Number’.  Everyone in the room will 
enter this number in Column 2. 
 
Then the experimenters will bring buckets around to each of you.  You will draw a penny 
from the bucket and the number on this penny will be called your ‘Individual Random 
Draw Number’.  Record your Individual Random Draw Number in column 3 of Sheet 1 
and then return the penny to the bucket.  
 
Calculation of Payments  
   11 
The amount of money you earn in each round will be determined as follows.  You will 
add your Decision Number (column 1) to the Group Random Draw Number (column 2) 
and to your Individual Random Draw Number (column 3)  – write this total in Column 4 
of Sheet 1.  Your pair member will do the same.  The experimenter will also record this 
information after you receive your Individual Random Draw Number. 
 
Since all subjects have worked in privacy, the experimenter will then compare the totals 
of you and your pair member.  If your total in Column 4 is greater than your pair 
member, you receive the high payment of $0.81; if your point total is smaller than your 
pair member, you receive the low payment of $0.40.  Whether you receive $0.81 or $0.40 
depends only on whether your point total is greater than or less than the point total of 
your pair member.  It does not depend on how much bigger or smaller it is.  If there is a 
tie in total points, the experimenter will flip a coin to determine who gets the high 
payment.   
 
The experimenter will announce whether you have received a high or low payment.  
Circle the appropriate payment in Column 5 and subtract the decision cost associated 
with your decision number, which is in Column 6.  Record this difference in Column 7.  
The amount in Column 7 is your earnings in dollars for the round unless this is a practice 
round.  If this is a paying round, this amount will be added to your running total, which is 
tabulated in Column 8.  Your running total at the end of the 10
th paying round is then 
carried forward to the next experiment. 
 
Before we get started, make sure that you write your chair number on “Sheet 1”.   
 


















Review of Instructions 
1.  Beginning of Round Announced 
2.  Choose Decision Number    ￿ Record in Column 1 
3.  Locate associated Decision Cost from Table 1   ￿ Record in Column 6 
4.  One Subject Draws Group Random Number  ￿ Record in Column 2 
5.  Each subject draw Individual Random Number  ￿ Record in Column 3 
6.  Add Numbers in Columns 1, 2 and 3  ￿ Record in Column 4 
7.  If your sum is:  
a.  Higher than your ‘pair member’  ￿ Circle $0.81 as your payment 
b.  Lower than your ‘pair member’  ￿ Circle $0.40 as your payment 
8.  Subtract your ‘Decision Cost’ from your payment  ￿ Record in Column 7 
9.  If this is a paying round then  ￿ Update running total (Col. 8)   12 
Example of Experimental Instructions for Symmetric Cost Fixed Standard Contract 
 
This experiment is identical to Experiment A in all aspects except the following. 
 
In Experiment A you received the high payment if the sum of your Decision Number, the 
Group Random Draw Number and your Individual Random Draw Number was greater 
than your pair member’s sum.  If your sum was lower than your pair member, you would 
receive the low payment. 
 
In this Experiment, you will receive a high payment of $0.85 if the sum of your Decision 
Number, the Group Random Draw Number and your Individual Random Draw Number 
is greater than or equal to 41.  If this sum is less than 41, you will receive a low payment 
of $0.43.  Whether you receive $0.85 or $0.43 as your payment depends only on whether 
your point total is greater than or equal to 41 – it does not depend on how much bigger or 
smaller. 
 
All instructions for recording your Decision Number, Decision Cost, Group Random 
Number, Individual Random Number and payment amount and all instructions for 
calculating your per round earnings are the same as before.   
 
You will resume tabulating your running total after the one practice round.  Please 
remember to carry forward your net running total from the bottom of Sheet 1 to the top of 
Column 7 on Sheet 2 so that you can correctly tabulate your running total for this 
experiment.  That is, your running total builds upon your net earnings from the previous 
experiment and will be carried forward to the next experiment. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 
 
Review of Instructions 
10. Beginning of Round Announced 
11. Choose Decision Number    ￿ Record in Column 1 
12. Locate associated Decision Cost from Table 1   ￿ Record in Column 6 
13. One subject draws Group Random Number  ￿ Record in Column 2 
14. Each subject draw Individual Random Number  ￿ Record in Column 3 
15. Add numbers in Columns 1, 2 and 3  ￿ Record in Column 4 
16. If your sum is:  
a.  Greater than or equal to 41  ￿ Circle $0.85 as your payment 
b.  Less than 41  ￿ Circle $0.43 as your payment 
17. Subtract your ‘Decision Cost’ from your payment  ￿ Record in Column 7 
18. If this is a paying round then  ￿ Update running total (Col. 8)   13 
Auction Instructions 
 
In the second half of today’s session you will have the opportunity to earn more money 
by participating in two more experiments identical to the two experiments played in the 
first half of today’s session only without the initial, non-paying practice rounds.  That is, 
the rules and the number of paying rounds for the experiments played in the second half 
will be exactly like those played in the first half.   
 
For each experiment, however, only 10 of you will be allowed to participate.  Which 10 
of you will participate in each experiment will be decided as follows.   
 
For Experiment A you will fill out a Experiment A bid card.  On this card you will place 
your chair number and the maximum number of dollars you would be willing to pay from 
your experimental earnings today in order to participate.  You will then fill out a similar 
card for Experiment B.  The total amount of your bids for Experiment A and Experiment 
B combined cannot exceed the running total of dollars you have earned so far in the 
experiment. 
 
We will collect the Experiment A and Experiment B bid cards from all participants and 
rank them from highest to lowest for each experiment.  The top 10 bids for each 
experiment will be allowed to play in that additional experiment.   
 
Each participant that gains entry into an additional experiment will have his/her running 
dollar total decreased by the amount of the 10
th place bid for that experiment.  Note: if 
your bid is higher than the 10
th place bid, you will pay less than the amount you bid.  In 
other words, you will gain no advantage by bidding less than your true value for entry to 
the additional experiment, since it is unlikely you would have to pay the full amount you 
bid. 
 
The two people with the lowest bids for each experiment will not be allowed to play in the 
additional experimental session and will not have any dollars deducted from their 







Review of Instructions 
19. Write maximum amount you are willing to pay to play an additional round of Experiment A 
on the Experiment A Bid Card 
20. Write maximum amount you are willing to pay to play an additional round of Experiment B 
on the Experiment B Bid Card 
21. Verify the sum of bids for Experiment A and B are not greater than your net running total. 
22. The top 10 bidders for each experiment will play in an additional experiment. 
23. Your net running totals will be reduced by the amount of the 10
th place bid if you were one 
of the top 10 bidders for that experiment. 
24. Your net running total will not be reduced if you are not in the top 10 bidders, but you can’t 
play in the additional experiment.   14 
Effort-Cost Table Used by Subjects During the Symmetric Cost Experiments. 
 
 





















0  0.0000    25  0.0625    50  0.2500    75  0.5625 
1  0.0001    26  0.0676    51  0.2601    76  0.5776 
2  0.0004    27  0.0729    52  0.2704    77  0.5929 
3  0.0009    28  0.0784    53  0.2809    78  0.6084 
4  0.0016    29  0.0841    54  0.2916    79  0.6241 
5  0.0025    30  0.0900    55  0.3025    80  0.6400 
6  0.0036    31  0.0961    56  0.3136    81  0.6561 
7  0.0049    32  0.1024    57  0.3249    82  0.6724 
8  0.0064    33  0.1089    58  0.3364    83  0.6889 
9  0.0081    34  0.1156    59  0.3481    84  0.7056 
10  0.0100    35  0.1225    60  0.3600    85  0.7225 
11  0.0121    36  0.1296    61  0.3721    86  0.7396 
12  0.0144    37  0.1369    62  0.3844    87  0.7569 
13  0.0169    38  0.1444    63  0.3969    88  0.7744 
14  0.0196    39  0.1521    64  0.4096    89  0.7921 
15  0.0225    40  0.1600    65  0.4225    90  0.8100 
16  0.0256    41  0.1681    66  0.4356    91  0.8281 
17  0.0289    42  0.1764    67  0.4489    92  0.8464 
18  0.0324    43  0.1849    68  0.4624    93  0.8649 
19  0.0361    44  0.1936    69  0.4761    94  0.8836 
20  0.0400    45  0.2025    70  0.4900    95  0.9025 
21  0.0441    46  0.2116    71  0.5041    96  0.9216 
22  0.0484    47  0.2209    72  0.5184    97  0.9409 
23  0.0529    48  0.2304    73  0.5329    98  0.9604 
24  0.0576    49  0.2401    74  0.5476    99  0.9801 
                  100  1.0000 
Note. This table allows subjects to calculate the cost of each effort level.  For example, if 
a subject chooses an effort (decision) level of “60”, it would cost her $0.36 or 36 cents.    15 




This is an experiment about decision making.  The instructions are simple, and if you 
follow them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of 




As you read these instructions you will be in a room with a number of other subjects.  
One of these subjects has been chosen to be paired with you by a random drawing of 
subject numbers conducted before you arrived.  This subject will be called your pair 
member.  The identity of your pair member will never be revealed to you and your pair 
member will never know your identity. 
 
In the experiment you will perform a simple task.  In each round of the experimental 
game you will choose a number between 0 and 100 – this is called your ‘Decision 
Number’.  Associated with each Decision Number is decision cost, which is listed in 
Column B of Table 1.  Note that the higher the Decision Number you choose, the higher 
is the associated decision cost.  Also, for each decision number, costs are lower in Table 
1A and higher in Table 1B.  Whether you have been assigned Table 1A or Table 1B 
depends on the seat you were assigned.  Those that arrived early were randomly assigned 
to either seat 1, 3, 9, or 2, 4, 10 and will have Table 1A.  If you are in seats 5, 7, 11, or 6, 
8, 12 you will have Table 1B.  If you have Table 1A, then your pair member will have 
Table 1B and vice versa.  
 
At the beginning of each round of the experimental game you and your pair member will 
each select a Decision Number separately.  Write your number in Column 1 of Sheet 1.  
Also, record the decision cost associated with your decision number in Column 6 of 
Sheet 1. 
 
When all subjects have selected their decision numbers, an experimenter will have one 
subject choose a penny from a bucket with a large number of pennies in it.  Each penny 
in the bucket has a number written on it and the set of all possible numbers range from –
35 to + 35.  The sheet “Distribution of the Random Number Draw” contains the 
frequency (number of pennies for each specific number).  You will note that more 
pennies feature numbers closer to zero and the fewer pennies feature numbers close to –
35 and +35.  In other words, there is a higher probability of drawing numbers closer to 
zero than numbers far from zero.  The penny chosen will be called the ‘Group Random 
Draw Number’.  Everyone in the room will enter this number in Column 2. 
 
Then the experimenters will bring buckets around to each of you.  You will draw a penny 
from the bucket and the number on this penny will be called your ‘Individual Random 
Draw Number’.  Record your Individual Random Draw Number in column 3 of Sheet 1 
and then return the penny to the bucket.    16 
 
Calculation of Payments  
 
The amount of money you earn in each round will be determined as follows.  You will 
add your Decision Number (column 1) to the Group Random Draw Number (column 2) 
and to your Individual Random Draw Number (column 3)  – write this total in Column 4 
of Sheet 1.  Your pair member will do the same.  The experimenter will also record this 
information after you receive your Individual Random Draw Number. 
 
Since all subjects have worked in privacy, the experimenter will then compare the totals 
of you and your pair member.  If your total in Column 4 is greater than your pair 
member, you receive the high payment of $0.95; if your point total is smaller than your 
pair member, you receive the low payment of $0.33.  Whether you receive $0.95 or $0.33 
depends only on whether your point total is greater than or less than the point total of 
your pair member.  It does not depend on how much bigger or smaller it is.  If there is a 
tie in total points, the Table 1B pair member gets the high payment. 
 
The experimenter will announce whether you have received a high or low payment.  
Circle the appropriate payment in Column 5 and subtract the decision cost associated 
with your decision number, which is in Column 6.  Record this difference in Column 7.  
The amount in Column 7 is your earnings in dollars for the round unless this is a practice 
round.  If this is a paying round, this amount will be added to your running total, which is 
tabulated in Column 8.  Your running total at the end of the 10
th paying round is then 
carried forward to the next experiment. 
 
Before we get started, make sure that you write your chair number on “Sheet 1”.   
 
You may also take a minute to look at your  pair member’s decision cost sheet.  
Once you have looked at it, please pass it to one of the experimenters and work 














Review of Instructions 
26. Beginning of Round Announced 
27. Choose Decision Number    ￿ Record in Column 1 
28. Locate associated Decision Cost from Table 1   ￿ Record in Column 6 
29. One Subject Draws Group Random Number  ￿ Record in Column 2 
30. Each subject draw Individual Random Number  ￿ Record in Column 3 
31. Add Numbers in Columns 1, 2 and 3  ￿ Record in Column 4 
32. If your sum is:  
a.  Higher than your ‘pair member’  ￿ Circle $0.95 as your payment 
b.  Lower than your ‘pair member’  ￿ Circle $0.33 as your payment 
33. Subtract your ‘Decision Cost’ from your payment  ￿ Record in Column 7 
34. If this is a paying round then  ￿ Update running total (Col. 8)   17 
Example of Fixed Standard Contract Instructions (“Experiment B”) 
Example of Instructions for the Asymmetric Cost Fixed Performance Session 
 
This experiment is identical to Experiment A in all aspects except the following. 
 
In Experiment A you received the high payment if the sum of your Decision Number, the 
Group Random Draw Number and your Individual Random Draw Number was greater 
than your pair member’s sum.  If your sum was lower than your pair member, you would 
receive the low payment. 
 
In this Experiment, you will receive a high payment of $0.95 if the sum of your Decision 
Number, the Group Random Draw Number and your Individual Random Draw Number 
is greater than or equal to 41.  If this sum is less than 41, you will receive a low payment 
of $0.40.  Whether you receive $0.95 or $0.40 as your payment depends only on whether 
your point total is greater than or equal to 41 – it does not depend on how much bigger or 
smaller. 
 
All instructions for recording your Decision Number, Decision Cost, Group Random 
Number, Individual Random Number and payment amount and all instructions for 
calculating your per round earnings are the same as before.   
 
You will resume tabulating your running total after the one practice round.  Please 
remember to carry forward your net running total from the bottom of Sheet 1 to the top of 
Column 7 on Sheet 2 so that you can correctly tabulate your running total for this 
experiment.  That is, your running total builds upon your net earnings from the previous 
experiment and will be carried forward to the next experiment. 
 






Review of Instructions 
35. Beginning of Round Announced 
36. Choose Decision Number    ￿ Record in Column 1 
37. Locate associated Decision Cost from Table 1   ￿ Record in Column 6 
38. One subject draws Group Random Number  ￿ Record in Column 2 
39. Each subject draw Individual Random Number  ￿ Record in Column 3 
40. Add numbers in Columns 1, 2 and 3  ￿ Record in Column 4 
41. If your sum is:  
a.  Greater than or equal to 41  ￿ Circle $0.95 as your payment 
b.  Less than 41  ￿ Circle $0.40 as your payment 
42. Subtract your ‘Decision Cost’ from your payment  ￿ Record in Column 7 
43. If this is a paying round then  ￿ Update running total (Col. 8)   18 
Effort-Cost Table for the Low Cost Subjects. 
 

































0  0.0000    25  0.0625    50  0.2500    75  0.5625 
1  0.0001    26  0.0676    51  0.2601    76  0.5776 
2  0.0004    27  0.0729    52  0.2704    77  0.5929 
3  0.0009    28  0.0784    53  0.2809    78  0.6084 
4  0.0016    29  0.0841    54  0.2916    79  0.6241 
5  0.0025    30  0.0900    55  0.3025    80  0.6400 
6  0.0036    31  0.0961    56  0.3136    81  0.6561 
7  0.0049    32  0.1024    57  0.3249    82  0.6724 
8  0.0064    33  0.1089    58  0.3364    83  0.6889 
9  0.0081    34  0.1156    59  0.3481    84  0.7056 
10  0.0100    35  0.1225    60  0.3600    85  0.7225 
11  0.0121    36  0.1296    61  0.3721    86  0.7396 
12  0.0144    37  0.1369    62  0.3844    87  0.7569 
13  0.0169    38  0.1444    63  0.3969    88  0.7744 
14  0.0196    39  0.1521    64  0.4096    89  0.7921 
15  0.0225    40  0.1600    65  0.4225    90  0.8100 
16  0.0256    41  0.1681    66  0.4356    91  0.8281 
17  0.0289    42  0.1764    67  0.4489    92  0.8464 
18  0.0324    43  0.1849    68  0.4624    93  0.8649 
19  0.0361    44  0.1936    69  0.4761    94  0.8836 
20  0.0400    45  0.2025    70  0.4900    95  0.9025 
21  0.0441    46  0.2116    71  0.5041    96  0.9216 
22  0.0484    47  0.2209    72  0.5184    97  0.9409 
23  0.0529    48  0.2304    73  0.5329    98  0.9604 
24  0.0576    49  0.2401    74  0.5476    99  0.9801 
                  100  1.0000 
   19 
Effort-Cost Table for the High Cost Subjects. 
 

































0  0.00000    25  0.09375    50  0.37500    75  0.84375 
1  0.00015    26  0.10140    51  0.39015    76  0.86640 
2  0.00060    27  0.10935    52  0.40560    77  0.88935 
3  0.00135    28  0.11760    53  0.42135    78  0.91260 
4  0.00240    29  0.12615    54  0.43740    79  0.93615 
5  0.00375    30  0.13500    55  0.45375    80  0.96000 
6  0.00540    31  0.14415    56  0.47040    81  0.98415 
7  0.00735    32  0.15360    57  0.48735    82  1.00860 
8  0.00960    33  0.16335    58  0.50460    83  1.03335 
9  0.01215    34  0.17340    59  0.52215    84  1.05840 
10  0.01500    35  0.18375    60  0.54000    85  1.08375 
11  0.01815    36  0.19440    61  0.55815    86  1.10940 
12  0.02160    37  0.20535    62  0.57660    87  1.13535 
13  0.02535    38  0.21660    63  0.59535    88  1.16160 
14  0.02940    39  0.22815    64  0.61440    89  1.18815 
15  0.03375    40  0.24000    65  0.63375    90  1.21500 
16  0.03840    41  0.25215    66  0.65340    91  1.24215 
17  0.04335    42  0.26460    67  0.67335    92  1.26960 
18  0.04860    43  0.27735    68  0.69360    93  1.29735 
19  0.05415    44  0.29040    69  0.71415    94  1.32540 
20  0.06000    45  0.30375    70  0.73500    95  1.35375 
21  0.06615    46  0.31740    71  0.75615    96  1.38240 
22  0.07260    47  0.33135    72  0.77760    97  1.41135 
23  0.07935    48  0.34560    73  0.79935    98  1.44060 
24  0.08640    49  0.36015    74  0.82140    99  1.47015 
                  100  1.50000 
   20 
Maple Code and Output Example: Risk Neutral F Contract Simulations
1 
> #note: this is the Maple program for the fixed 
performance contract under symmetric costs, risk neutrality 
and no inequality aversion.  This is essentially the 
benchmark case.  Note: it is straightforward to get the 
asymmetric cost simulations using this file.  Just do the 
following: (1) change "alpha" from 1 to 1.5, (2) change 
payment parameters.  That is, let m=.40 and "spread" be 
.55, and (3) once you have the new optimal effort levels, 
be sure to plug them into the equations that simulate 
expected profits, expected utility, variance of profits 
etc.  These equations are near the bottom of this program.  
If these substitutions are not made, results can be 
misleading.   
> restart; 
 
> sigmac:=0;sigma :=500;#sigmac is common shock variance, 
sigma is idiosyncratic variance, although for fixed 
performance contracts, it is irrelevant so long as total 
variance is equal to 500. 
> alpha:=1;  #for symmetric costs, set this equal to "1".  
For asymmetric, set this equal to "1.5" 
> m:=.43;spread:=.42; M:=m+spread;  #m is "r" in the paper.  
M is "R".  Note M>m. For the fixed performance contract, 
these payoffs change across symmetric and asymmetric cost 















                                                 
1 We only include MAPLE code for the risk neutral F contract simulations and the risk averse-inequality 
averse T (with a common shock variance of 250) simulations.  Maple code and output for the remaining 
simulations are available upon request from the authors.  Email wu.412@osu.edu for the MAPLE 
programs.   21 
> n1:=(1/((2*3.14*(sigma+sigmac))^(1/2)))*exp((-
1/2)*(((u)^2)/(sigma+sigmac))); #This is the normal 
probability density function for agent 1. 










1/2)*(((u2)^2)/(sigma+sigmac))); #This is the normal 
probability density function for agent 2. 









>  UM:=M-alpha*(e1^2)/10000; #This agent 1's "utility" 
under high performance. Note utility=profit under risk 
neutrality. 




> UMa:=M-alpha*(e1^2)/10000;#This is agent 1's utility 
under high performance. 




> Um:=m-alpha*(e1^2)/10000;#This is agent 1's utility under 
low performance. 




> Umd:=m-alpha*(e1^2)/10000;#This is agent 1's utility 
under low performance. 




> cdf1:=int(n1,u=-infinity...(41-e1));#This is agent 1's 
cumulative distribution function. 
cdf1 := 0.5001267877 - 0.5001267877 erf -1.296533841 + 0.03162277660 e1 ( )
 
> UM2:=M-(e2^2)/10000;# Repeat above for agent 2 (next 5 
lines). 




> UM2a:=M-(e2^2)/10000;   22 









> Um2d:=m-(e2^2)/10000;  









cdf2)*Umd+cdf1*cdf2*Um;  #Agent 1's expected utility 
(profit). 
EU1 :=  0.4998732123 + 0.5001267877 erf -1.296533841 + 0.03162277660 e1 ( ) ( ) (0.4998732123










 + 0.5001267877 erf -1.296533841 + 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) (0.5001267877
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> DEU1:=diff(EU1,e1);#Derivative of expected utility with 
respect to e1. 
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> EU2:=(1-cdf1)*(1-cdf2)*UM2+cdf1*(1-cdf2)*UM2a+(1-
cdf1)*cdf2*Um2d+cdf1*cdf2*Um2;#Agent 2's expected utility.  
EU2 :=  0.4998732123 + 0.5001267877 erf -1.296533841 + 0.03162277660 e1 ( ) ( ) (0.4998732123










 - 0.5001267877 erf -1.296533841 + 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) (0.4998732123










 + 0.5001267877 erf -1.296533841 + 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) (0.5001267877









 + (0.5001267877  24 
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> DEU2:=diff(EU2,e2);#Derivative of agent 2's expected 
utility with respect to e2.  
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> focEU1:=DEU1=0;focEU2:=DEU2=0;#First order conditions   25 
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> fsolve({focEU1,focEU2},{e1=0..100,e2=0..100});#solving 
first order conditions for optimal efforts.  
e2 = 36.83010387, e1 = 36.83010387 { }
 
> DDEU1:=diff(DEU1,e1); DDEU2:=diff(DEU2,e2);#second order 
derivative of expected utility   27 
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order conditions to ensure maximum.  Note: make sure you 
plug in the right numbers for effort level when you change 
other parameters.  For example, changing variance and 
payments will affect optimal effort and these new optimal   29 












cdf2),e2=36.83010387);#probabilities of achieving the high 













Eutility2  := 0.4732270085
 
>  
> eprofit:=(1-cdf1)*(M)+cdf1*(m)-(e1^2)/10000;#same as 
indirect utility because this is the risk neutral case.  
For the risk averse and inequality aversion cases, 
separating expected profit from expected utility is more 
meaningful. 




> vprofit:=cdf1*(1-cdf1)*(spread)^2;#variance of expected 
profit. 
vprofit := 0.1764  0.5001267877 - 0.5001267877 erf -1.296533841 + 0.03162277660 e1 ( ) ( ) (0.4998732123
 + 0.5001267877 erf -1.296533841 + 0.03162277660 e1 ( ))
 
> eval(eprofit,{e1=36.83010387,e2=36.83010387}); #expected 








Maple Code and Output Example: Risk Averse-Inequality Averse T Simulations 
 
> #This is a tournament simulation where the common shock 
variance is 250.   Agents are risk averse and inequality 
averse. Costs are symmetric. Note: it is straightforward to 
get the asymmetric cost simulations using this file.  Just 
do the following: (1) change "alpha" from 1 to 1.5, (2) 
change payment parameters.  That is, let m=.40 and "spread" 
be .41, and (3) once you have the new equilibrium effort 
levels, be sure to plug them into the equations that 
simulate expected profits, expected utility, variance of 
profits etc.  These equations are near the bottom of this 
program.  If these substitutions are not made, results can 
be misleading.   
> #Also note that it is straightforward to generate the 
other tournament simulations with different common shock 
variances.  For example, if you wanted to generate the 
experiment where the common shock variance is 350, do the 
following: (1) Change "Sigma" from 250 to 150 (note that 
sigma is the idiosyncratic shock variance and the sum of 
the variances need to be 500), (2) Change payments so that 
m =.45 and spread=.32, and (3) once you have the new 
equilibrium effort levels, be sure to plug them into the 
equations that simulate expected utility, expected profits, 
variance of profits etc.  These equations are near the 
bottom of this program.  If these substitutions are not 
made, results can be misleading.  Experiments for common 
shock variance equaling 0 and 50 by following a similar 
sequence of steps (make sure payments m and M are adjusted 
accordingly.  See paper for specific values). 
>  
> restart; 
> sigma :=250;alpha:=1;evalf(sigma^(0.5));#sigma is 
idiosyncratic variance, common shock variance is filtered 







> m:=.40;spread:=.41; M:=m+spread; #m is "r" in the paper.  
M is "R".  Note M>m.   See paper. 
m := 0.40





> w:=1;  #this is initial wealth.  Because our utility 
function exponentiates payments, we had to ensure that 
total payments exceeds 1.  We did this by giving the agent 
an initial wealth of 1 which guarantees that total payment 
under each state of nature exceeds 1.  While we set w = 1, 
it can be arbitrarily set at any value greater than 1.  We 
conducted sensivity analysis by setting w = 20 to make sure 
that our qualitative predictions did not change.  This was 
important to check because our utility funciton exhibits 
decreasing absolute risk aversion.  We found that no 
qualitative results changed. You can verify this be 











1/2)*(((u1)^2)/(sigma*(2))));#This is the normal 
probability density of the agents. 








> A:=0.731;beta:=0.029;theta:=5;  #These are the parameters 







> adv:=0; disadv:=.15;  #these are the inequality aversion 










adv*spread1;#Agent 1's utility when he "wins".  
UM1 := 5. - e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
10000










disadv*spread1;#Agent 1's utility when he "loses". 
Um1 := 4.998897054 - e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
10000











adv*spread1;#Agent 2's utility when he "wins"  
UM2 := 5. - e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
10000










disadv*spread1;#Agent 2's utility when he "loses". 
Um2 := 4.998897054 - e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
10000










> cdf:=int(n1,u1=-infinity...(e2-e1));# the cumulative 
distribution function. 
cdf := 0.5001267876 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )
 
> EU1:=(1-cdf)*UM1+cdf*Um1; EU2:=cdf*UM2+(1-
cdf)*Um2;#Expected utilities for the two agents. 
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10000












￿  + (0.5001267876  33 
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￿  + (0.4998732124







-0.029  1.40 -  1
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> DEU1:=diff(EU1,e1); DEU2:=diff(EU2,e2);#First order 
derivatives of expected utilities. 
DEU1 := 
0.03163079535 e
- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
  5. - e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
10000




































 - 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e1 e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
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-0.029  1.40 -  1
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￿  -  1
















(0.5001267876 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e1 
e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
10000
















- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
  5. - e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
10000




































 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e2 e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
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-0.029  1.40 -  1
10000

















￿  -  1















￿ 0.000004239800000   35 
(0.4998732124 - 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e2 
e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
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- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
  5. - e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
10000




































 - 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e1 e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
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￿  -  1
















(0.5001267876 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e1 
e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
10000












￿  = 0
   36 
foc2 := 
0.03163079535 e
- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
  5. - e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
10000




































 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e2 e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
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￿  -  1
















(0.4998732124 - 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e2 
e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
10000












￿  = 0
 
> fsolve({foc1,foc2},{e1=0..100,e2=0..100});#solving first 
order conditions for equilibrium efforts. 
e1 = 41.77893461, e2 = 41.77996031 { }
 
> DDEU1:=diff(DEU1,e1); DDEU2:=diff(DEU2,e2); #Second order 
derivatives.   37 







￿ 0.03163079535  0.002000000000 e2 - 0.002000000000 e1 ( ) 
e
- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
  5. - e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
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- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
 e1 e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
10000




































 - 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e1
2 e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
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￿  - 
1















 - 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
10000












￿  - 
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 - 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e1
2 e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
10000




















￿ 0.03163079535  0.002000000000 e2 - 0.002000000000 e1 ( ) 
e
- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
  4.998897054 - e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
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- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
 e1 e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
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 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e1
2 e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
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￿  - 
1















 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
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￿  - 
1
















 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e1
2 e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
10000
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￿ 0.03163079535  -0.002000000000 e2 + 0.002000000000 e1 ( ) 
e
- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
  5. - e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
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- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
 e2 e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
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 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e2
2 e
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 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
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 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e2
2 e
-0.029  1.81 -  1
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￿ 0.03163079535  -0.002000000000 e2 + 0.002000000000 e1 ( ) 
e
- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
  4.998897054 - e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
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- 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )2 ( )
 e2 e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
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 - 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e2
2 e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
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1















 - 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
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￿  - 
1
















 - 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( )) e2
2 e
-0.029  1.40 -  1
10000













   41 
> soc1:=eval(DDEU1,{e1=41.77893461,e2=41.77996031});#Agent 
















probability of winning the tournament 
> 
winprob2:=eval(cdf,{e1=41.77893461,e2=41.77996031});#Agent 








96031});#expected profit for agent 1 








);#expected profit for agent 2 









ect expected utility for agent 1 
EUtility1 := 4.036339882
   42 
> 
EUtility2:=eval(EU2,{e1=41.77893461,e2=41.77996031});#indir





> vprofit:=cdf*(1-cdf)*(spread)^2;#variance of profit 
vprofit := 0.1681  0.5001267876 + 0.5001267876 erf 0.03162277660 e2 - 0.03162277660 e1 ( ) ( ) (0.4998732124
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